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Abstract
This paper presents and analyzes a group of statistics which
characterize the level and evolution of the labor income polarization in 
Greater Buenos Aires over the past two decades (1986-2006). The 
empirical evidence reveals two stages throughout those years: the first 
one distinguished by an increment of all indices and the second one,
by shrinkage of them. Inspecting potential factors which could explain 
those changes, returns to education surge as the main polarization 
force in the labor market. Hence, an equalizing distribution of the 
human capital is a possible alternative for a less polarized labor 
market.
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2I. Introduction
Inequality is definitely the income distributional dimension more studied. Economists 
have contributed to the discussion of social fairness, and have developed a large 
literature on the measurement of inequality.1 However, inequality measures consistent 
with the Dalton-Pigou transfers’ principle can not provide us with a complete
characterization of the income distribution. 
Polarization is another dimension of the income distribution which has been studied 
during the last decade at a fast path. This concept refers to the antagonisms between 
groups which are internally homogeneous and increasingly different among them. Both 
polarization and inequality are different although related dimensions of the same 
distribution. Thus, the analysis of polarization should be considered as complementary 
to that of inequality.
The motivation for analyzing this phenomenon is the link between polarization and social 
tensions and instability. Social cohesion is likely to be weak when the dispersion in the 
socioeconomic characteristics of a population is high. If people have access to 
substantially different sets of opportunities, and enjoy (or suffer) very different living 
standards, social tensions are likely to emerge. An economically polarized country is 
more likely to be socially and politically unstable.2
This study documents the characterization of the hourly wages in Greater Buenos Aires 
from 1986 until 2006, particularly from the economic polarization perspective. The labor 
market is the main scenario in which inequalities and income poles emerge3. The reason 
could be justified by the lack of capacity of other sources to explain the evolution of 
income inequality and income polarization. Firstly, household surveys have many 
deficiencies in capturing capital income, entrepreneur benefits and rents.4 The 
Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares or EPH) of Argentina 
is not an exception. Secondly, in Latin American countries there is evidence of the 
weakness of their redistributive schemes.5 Thus, the governmental transfers could not 
be a feasible source to explain inequality and polarization changes. Lastly, the 
demographic structure could not seem a relevant explicative factor either.6 Hence, 
differences in labor income would be the main sources to explain income inequality and 
income polarization changes documented in several studies that analyze the evolution of 
welfare measures such as household per capita income and adult equivalized income.7
There are many other factors which could be independent of the labor market and could 
explain the inequality and polarization movements. In order to take them into account, 
we present and analyze several labor indicators which depend on demographic and 
                                                
1 See Atkinson and Bourguignon (eds.) (2000), Deaton (1997), Cowell (2000) and Lambert (2001). 
2 Of course, the causality can go both directions: socioeconomic fragmentation can be the consequence of social and 
political instability (Gasparini, et.al. 2008). 
3 Gasparini et.al (2008).
4 Deaton (1997) .
5 Gasparini, et al (2005a).
6 Haimovich, et. al.(2005).
7 Gasparini, et. al (2008); Horenstein and Olivieri (2004).
3social characteristics of the population and we also perform micro-econometric 
decompositions.
The rest of the document is organised as follows. In section II we briefly discuss the 
concept of economic polarization from different perspectives, characteristics and pure 
income polarization. In section III we present some methodological features as well as a 
descriptive analysis of the labor market in Greater Buenos Aires, access and 
employment conditions and polarization by main characteristics of the population. 
Section IV is focussed on the evolution of the pure hourly labor income polarization and 
the decomposition of those changes. Section V closes with concluding remarks.
II. The measurement of polarization 
In order to measure the level and changes in polarization we will rely on the alienation-
identification framework proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994): a population is polarized 
if (i) there are few groups of important size, (ii) in which their members share an attribute 
and feel some degree of identification with members of their own group, and (iii) 
members of different groups feel alienated from each other. 
Income polarization measures could be classified into two main sets. Although both sets 
use income as the variable for alienation, they differ in the nature of identification. While 
the first uses a discrete variable to provide the relevant grouping of the population, the 
latter uses income. The first set is known as “polarization by characteristics”, whereas 
the second is called “pure income polarization”. For instance, income polarization by the 
area where the household lives (urban-rural) is part of the first set, while income 
polarization where individuals identify themselves with those with similar income levels is 
known as “pure income polarization”. 
Gradín Group Polarization (1999)
Zhang - Kanbur (2001)
Continous       
variable: income
Polarization by 
Characteristics
Pure Income 
Polarization
Duclos-Esteban-Ray (2004) -EGR - 
Wolfson
Discrete variable: 
area, race, educational 
level, etc 
Continous      
variable: income
Continous      
variable: income
IDENTIFICATION ALIENATION TYPE INDEX
Source: Gasparini et.al. (2008)
In what follows we provide a brief overview of the polarization measures to be used 
throughout this paper.8
Polarization by characteristics
Although alienation is considered to be into the income space, there might be other 
population characteristics that create group identity (e.g. religion in Northern Ireland, 
race in USA). As Gradín (2000) states it, “despite polarization occurring in the income 
                                                
8 See Methodological appendix for further details of polarization indexes.
4space, groups in the distribution are the result of similarities with respect to a relevant 
attribute other than income”. Therefore, it is interesting to explore different attributes that 
could potentially reflect a well-defined social group. 
The literature on polarization by characteristics has been recently increasing at a fast 
pace. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) measure polarization in an empirical analysis of civil 
war, Reynal-Querol (2001) studies polarization by religion groups and its relationship 
with the probability of a conflict in sub-Saharan countries, D’Ambrosio (2001) argues that 
the region of residence accounts for polarization in the Italian distribution of personal 
income, Gradín (2000) finds that education and socioeconomic conditions are the key 
variables to explain polarization in the Spanish distribution of income, and Zhang and 
Kanbur (2001) apply some polarization measures to regional disparities in China.
In this paper we use Gradín (2000) “group polarization”, and Zhang and Kanbur (2001) 
indices. Gradín (2000) makes an extension of the Esteban and Ray (1994) approach to 
polarization in order to analyze the role of different household characteristics in the 
formation of groups, and unlike other measures, accounts for both intra-group inequality 
as well as the overlapping between groups. Zhang and Kanbur (2001) propose an index 
of polarization which is based on the ratio of the between-group inequality to the within-
group inequality – both measured with Theil’s Generalized Entropy index, where groups 
are defined accordingly with an attribute. See the Appendix for more on both indicators 
of group polarization.
Pure income polarization
To carry out pure income polarization measures we assume that income is a proxy of 
other relevant characteristics that generate identification among individuals. The first 
approach to implement a pure income polarization measure is based on the idea of 
discrete groups or socioeconomic classes. Following this logic, it is necessary to identify 
the number and the support interval of each disjoint group. Wolfson (1994), Esteban and 
Ray (1994) and Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999) are the main contributions in this 
approach. Wolfson’s (1994) measure assumes two groups of equal size, while the ER 
(1994) measure allows n groups of potentially different sizes. EGR (1999) leaves the 
determination of the number of groups to the researcher, while implements a 
methodology to endogenously determine group sizes based on the idea of minimizing 
income heterogeneity within groups. See the Appendix for further information. 
Esteban et al. (1999) implement two enhancements on the original ER index (Esteban 
and Ray, 1994). The first includes a correction to account for intragroup dispersion, and 
the second, a methodology for selecting group sizes. This approach consists of choosing 
the n-spike distribution that minimizes the income dispersion within all socioeconomic 
classes (see Appendix). 
Although the framework discussed so far follows an intuitive and common way to refer to 
different socioeconomic strata, the division of the income distribution in a finite number 
of groups is odd due to the continuous nature of income variable. This fact implies some 
drawbacks: (i) there is a degree of arbitrariness in the choice of the number of income
5groups, and (ii) continuous changes in polarization are not captured in some cases, 
given that the population is divided into a finite number of groups. 
The Duclos-Esteban-Ray index (DER)9 sets out to solve these problems. In order to do 
so, they redefine the axioms that must be satisfied by a polarization index for continuous 
variables and present a measure of pure income polarization. This new index allows for 
individuals not to be clustered around discrete income intervals, and lets the area of 
identification influence be determined by nonparametric kernel techniques, avoiding 
arbitrary choices. The authors establish that a general polarization measure that 
respects a basic set of axioms must be proportional to:
 )()()()( ydFygyfFP 
where y denotes income and F(y) its distribution. The function g(y) captures the 
alienation effect while f(y) captures the identification effect. The higher the  parameter, 
the larger the weight attached to identification in the polarization index.10 It can be shown 
that in order to respect the axioms, the parameter  must lie within the interval [0.25, 1]. 
See the Appendix for details. 
The DER index allows us to account for changes in polarization through the contribution 
of alienation, identification and their joint co-movements. Increased alienation is 
associated with an increase in income distances, while increased identification implies a 
sharper definition of groups. When taken jointly, these effects may reinforce each other, 
in the sense that alienation may be highest at the incomes that have experienced an 
increase in identification, or they may counterbalance each other. 
III. Greater Buenos Aires Labor Market
III.1 Methodological features
This document is based on microdata from the Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta 
Permanente de Hogares or EPH) carried out by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y 
Censos (INDEC) since 1974. The database used here is part of the Socio-Economic 
Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). This is a large database of 
household surveys from 21 countries assembled by CEDLAS and the World Bank. 
We employ data for individuals living in the Greater Buenos Aires area for the period 
1986-2006. We use the October wave from 1986 to 2002 (EPH – Puntual) and the 
second semester information since 2003 (EPH – Continua). The survey covers only 
urban population. 
For simplicity several sections of this study are focused on years of relative 
macroeconomic stability separated by equal intervals: 1986, 1992, 1998 and 2004. We 
also include 2006 into the analysis in order to consider the last available information.
The first period, from 1986 to 1992, was characterized by a drastic fall in GDP and 
                                                
9 Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004).
10 When =0 identification within groups is ignored by the index. In that case, the polarization index coincides with the Gini 
coefficient.
6unprecedented rates of inflation. The 1992–98 interval was one of relatively fast growth 
and structural reforms which were followed by significant changes in the sectoral 
structure of the economy. The last one, 1998-2004, includes a stage of stagnation and 
crisis (up to early 2000s) and the beginning of the subsequent recovery.   
The variable we use to compute polarization indices and inequality measures is the 
hourly wage income in the main occupation. The population of interest is made up of 
people with 15 years old or more. We provide an exhaustive descriptive analysis of this 
variable in Section III.
III.2 Access and employment conditions
This section presents the characterization of the labor market outcomes during the 
periods previously defined. We analyze the employment access according to different 
population’s groups: gender, education and age; and the evolution of hourly wage and 
hours of work of employed people. We consider three age groups: between 15 and 24 
years old, 25 to 64 and more than 65 years old.  The educational level categories were 
defined by years of education: up to 8 years of education (unskilled), between 9 and 13 
years of education (semi-skilled) and more than 13 (skilled). 
Employment access
The Greater Buenos Aires employment rate has not changed significantly over the whole 
period, averaging 52%. Given the sustained increase of the participation rate the 
conclusion is straightforward: the unemployment rate has experienced a consistent 
pattern of increase. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable over the growth period of 
early and mid-90’s. For this reason, 1992-98 could be characterized as one of the 
weakest employment generation periods.
Figure III.1 illustrates changes patterns in the employment, unemployment, and 
participation rates for groups of individuals defined according to gender, age and 
educational level. 
Grouping by gender, we found a sustained increment in women participation rate. In 
fact, the gender participation gap has been falling during the whole period. The same 
happened to the employment gap which has fallen because of the reduction of the male
employment rate up to 1998 and the sustained increase of the women employment rate,
particularly in the last period. In spite of these facts, the gender unemployment gap has 
been growing since 1998. This could be explained by the more intense impact of the 
surge in unemployment rate over the women. In summary, women have been joining 
into the labor market, mainly during 1992-98, but not all of them could be absorbed. One 
possible explanation is a slow reaction of the labor market to the rise of the women labor 
force participation. Alternatively, women job search could last more because they are 
looking for specific job attributes like flexible schedules which allow them to balance their 
productive and reproductive roles.
The classification of the population by age shows the expected employment rate profile: 
younger people delay their entry into the labor market because they are still investing in 
7human capital. People in the middle age group are in their more active stage of the life 
cycle while those who have more than 64 are in the retirement period.
Figure III. 2 illustrates this relation for all the years considered. The employment rate of 
the younger group has been falling during the whole period while it grew up for the 
others two groups. The less variable employment rate of the older group could be 
related to the coverage of the pension system11.
Unemployment is higher among the youth as expected. Their unemployment rate has
been growing up to 2004. Notice that while the unemployment rate of the middle and 
older age groups were falling in the 1998-2004 period, it raised for the younger group. 
Although a lower employment rate for the youth could be explained by higher levels of 
human capital investments, the growing unemployment among them brings down that 
explanation. The conclusion is that the younger are becoming increasingly excluded 
from the labor market and this could be a source of conflicts and a weaker social 
cohesion12.
Figure III.3 reports a positive correlation between educational levels and employment 
rate. The relation is not so clear when we consider the unemployment rate. In the last 
years of the sample, the unemployment rate of semi-skilled was higher than for unskilled 
people. This could be due to difficulties and longer periods of time necessary to do the 
matching in the labor market. For instance, if job requisites are demanding and 
individuals are wealthy enough, the more skilled-workers will dedicate more time to the 
searching process.
The pattern of change of the unemployment rate was unbalanced among groups of 
different educational level. When unemployment grew dramatically in the 1992-98
period, the increment was higher for unskilled people than for others groups. Even in a 
context of strong growth as consequence of structural reforms at national level, the labor 
market could not absorb the unskilled labor force. In other words, part of the labor force 
was becoming increasingly less attractive for the labor market; hence they had fewer 
chances to find a decent job, and to be integrated into the market economy. In this 
context social tensions are more likely to come out. It is interesting to notice that in the 
1998-2004 period the unemployment rate of semi-skilled and skilled people grew up 
while that of unskilled people were falling. Furthermore, the declining in the last period 
considered (2004-2006) was more intense for the unskilled group. In spite of this 
behavior and the economic recovery, the level of the unemployment rate of the unskilled 
remained higher than in the previous decade.
Employment conditions
This section analyzes hours of work and wage gaps grouping the labor force by gender, 
age, educational level and informality condition. The reason for considering this last 
                                                
11 In a comparative study, Gasparini et al. (2006) find that the low employment rates of older people in Argentina, Brazil, 
Costa Rica and Chile are associated to the high coverage of the pension systems while in countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua the high employment rates of that group are related to weak pension systems.
12 Even though the unemployment rate fell in the 2004-2006 period among all age groups, the fall was smaller for the 
youth.
8characteristic has to do with the high proportion of the Greater Buenos Aires labor 
market this phenomenon represents. 
We use two different definitions of labor informality which do not correspond to 
competing views about this phenomenon. Instead, they refer to different aspects of the 
labor market.13 The “productive” definition pictures informal workers as those in low-
productivity, unskilled, marginal jobs, while the “legalistic” definition stresses the lack of 
labor protection and social security benefits.14
Figure III.4 and Table III.1 report labor gaps for different groups of workers. The mean 
hourly wage of men exceeded that of women during the whole period. The gap has 
shown a volatile path with a growing pattern between 1992 and 2004 and a decline in
2006. In spite of this behavior the gender wage gap remained superior to that registered 
in 1992: in 2006, a man earned 12% more than a woman while this difference was about
7% in 1992. Women wages are still lower than their male counterparts when controlling 
for observable characteristics (Table III.2).  The gap of hours of work is wider respect to 
the wage gap and it has been growing up since 1986 with a slight decline in 2006.
People in middle age group earn more than workers in the younger group as expected 
given their greater experience and seniority. The hours of work gap shows that younger 
people work less in average than workers in central labor age. This result brings a new 
sign of the exclusion of the youth from the labor market together with their wage loses 
because of the growing wage gap.
Considering groups by educational levels, we find that the wage gap between skilled and 
the rest has significantly widened over the whole period under analysis with a slight 
decline in 2006. In particular, the wage gap experienced a dramatic increase during 
1992-98. That was a period of reforms that were followed by significant changes in the 
sectoral structure of the economy, and maybe more important, changes in the ways of 
production used throughout the economy. Notice that the economic changes affected 
the unskilled and the semi-skilled in roughly the same way: while the wage gap between 
skilled workers and the rest was growing up, that of semi-skilled and unskilled remained 
quite stable. As a result, these two groups became increasingly alike, in comparison with 
the skilled. Table III.2 illustrates changes in the gap skilled/unskilled by showing the 
coefficient for a college dummy in a Mincer equation. Hence, the distance in terms of 
hourly wage is the factor that gets aside the group of semi-skilled and unskilled people 
from those with formal education. It seems that skilled people have taken advantage of 
the new economic environment and the rest of the workers have struggled with the new 
economic conditions. We expect that a pattern of unbalanced growth of opportunities 
and outcomes in the labor market may weaken social cohesion and leads to social 
instability. 
Finally, we analyze labor gaps grouping workers by their informality condition. According 
to both definitions, an informal worker earns less than a formal one and the effect is 
                                                
13 Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007).
14 To implement this classification we consider an individual is an informal worker if he is a salaried worker in a small 
private firm (up to 5 employees), an unskilled self-employed or zero-income worker.
9more intense using the “legalistic” definition. The gap has shown a volatile path using the 
“legalistic” definition while the pattern was one of consistent increase when we use the 
“productive” notion with a slight recovery in the last year considered. A similar behavior 
is shown by the hours of work gap: informal workers tend to work less respect to workers 
that do not satisfy that condition. This result is robust to both informality definitions. 
The access and employment conditions analysis provide us with relevant evidence to 
interpret the patterns of changes of labor income polarization indices:
 The women participation rate increased in a sustained manner which translated
into a reduction in the gender employment gap. However, the unemployment gap 
has grown since 1992. The hours of work gap increased during the whole period 
analyzed with a recovery during 2006 and the same behavior was shown by the 
gender wage gap since 1992.
 There are some signs of exclusion of the youth from the labor market: younger 
people report the lower employment rate and a higher incidence of 
unemployment with respect to other age groups. Similarly, there is a gap in terms 
of hours of work and wage of younger workers with respect to people in central 
labor age.
 There is a positive correlation between the employment rate and educational 
levels. The increase in the unemployment rate was more intense for the unskilled 
in the 1992-1998 period. This result suggests the exclusion of the unskilled from 
the labor market. Furthermore, skilled workers are moving further away from the 
rest in terms of hourly wage.
 The wage gap in terms of informality condition has been getting wider since 1992
with a recovery in 2006.
We expect all this evidence to be a potential source of social tension and instability. 
Unfortunately, there is no information about conflicts, political or social tension that 
allows us to explore the relationship between labor income polarization and social
tension and instability for the case of Argentina.
III.3 Polarization by characteristics
In this section we try to identify those variables that are more relevant to characterize the 
labor force population of Greater Buenos Aires into homogeneous groups that 
antagonize each other in terms of income in the labor market. We consider six 
alternative groupings of the population according to gender, age, educational level, 
productive sector, labor relationship15 and informality condition. Table III.3 presents the 
Gradín Group Polarization (GGP) and the Zhang and Kanbur (ZK) indices computed for 
each year of the sample.
                                                
15 Labor relationship variable includes four categories: employer, salaried worker, self-employed and zero-income 
workers.
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For both indicators education is the most relevant variable for income polarization, 
followed by productive sector for the GGP index and, depending on the year, productive 
sector and informality condition (legalistic definition) for the ZK index.
This result suggests that when divided by education, people in each group look more 
alike, and differences across groups are larger than when dividing by other 
characteristic. In particular, the classification by gender looks almost irrelevant for 
polarization in spite of the gender wage gap that was reported in section III.216.
Table III.4 shows the sign of the change in the ZK index and its components (between 
and within). The analysis of the results is made for those variables that were more 
relevant to explain polarization in the labor market. 
The sign of the change in the ZK index is the same when we take into account the
educational level or productive sector as variables that determined the grouping of 
working population. Polarization by those characteristics has shown a volatile pattern 
through time. When people are group by their informality condition (legal definition) 
polarization shows a consistent growing pattern since 1992.
The ZK index evolution by educational level could be analyzed taking into account the 
results obtained in section III.2. The dramatic increase in the wage gap between skilled 
workers and the rest during the 1992-1998 range explained the higher between 
component that prevails over the less homogenous definition of the groups. In the 1998-
2004 period the wage gap between unskilled and semi-skilled people fell and translated 
into a more precise definition of the groups. But the less distance between them in the 
income space determined a reduction in the ZK index.  The same applies to polarization 
by informality condition (legal definition). When the wage gap between informal and no 
informal workers increased the same thing occurred with the between component. That 
means that the groups were getting aside in the income space. The higher distance 
between groups translated into a higher ZK index in spite of the less precise definition of 
the groups.
IV. Pure Labor Income Polarization
In this section we turn to the analysis of pure labor income polarization. In addition to 
documenting the level and changes in polarization, this section studies what is the 
empirical difference between inequality and polarization, and inspects which are the 
sources of those changes. In order to do so, we divide the section into two subsections:
the first one focuses on the first two topics and reports various indices of pure income 
polarization (Wolfson, EGR and DER for several parameters) for all years in our sample,
as well as the Gini inequality index for the hourly wage distribution. In the second 
subsection, we use micro-decomposition techniques in order to examine some factors 
which may explain the changes in labor income polarization.
                                                
16 This result could be explained by the very nature of the polarization notion. It needs more than a wage gap between 
men and women. It also requires people in each group to feel identified with people in their own group.
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IV.1 Pure income polarization: levels and changes 
Table IV.1 and Figure IV.1 show the evolution of pure income polarization indices for 
hourly wages in Greater Buenos Aires over the past two decades. The indices were 
estimated considering different values for the identification parameter. We also present 
the Gini inequality index in order to compare the notion of inequality with that of 
polarization.
If we consider the EGR index, we can observe that the bipolarization index is always 
below the level of the three-spike index for every value of the identification parameter. 
The EGR criterion to decide the relevant number of groups in the society consists of 
choosing the number for which the polarization index is higher. Following this rule, the 
distribution of hourly wages would be characterized by three income poles throughout 
the time.
The distribution of this statistics is unknown, so in order to validate them statistically we 
constructed confidence intervals using bootstrapping techniques. Table IV.2 and Figure 
IV.2 present the results for the 95% confidence intervals for the Gini and DER indices 
using two alternative values for the -parameter. This exercise was made with 500 
replications. We observe that polarization indices are very precise because of the 
narrowed range of the interval which not exceeds 0.019. However, the opposite occurs 
with the inequality index which presents a relatively wider range of variability (0.046 in 
average).
Figure IV.2 also shows the methodological change in the Household Survey in 2003. 
This change did not generate a significant modification in Gini and DER evolution due to 
the overlapping between confidence intervals of each household survey.
Table IV.3 presents the sign of the change in pure income polarization and the inequality 
index for hourly wages for the intervals of time previously defined. Simultaneously, we 
test the statistic significance of those sings using the re-sampling technique with 500 
replications.
The first bracket of time (1986-92) does not show significant changes for inequality nor
for polarization indices. The EGR with three-spikes is the exception. This index presents 
a reduction in polarization at 10% significance level and at 5% when we consider an 
parameter equal to 1.
The evolution of the indices was totally different during the second period (1992-98). 
Table VI.3 shows that both inequality and polarization raised at 1% significance level.
Other studies present evidence of this dramatic increment in inequality during this stage 
and point out the difficulty to find another recent period with such a dramatic change.17
The last interval (1998-2004) is interesting from the labor income distribution point of 
view because it compares the last pre-crisis year with the recovery stage which began in
mid-2002. As said before, inequality and polarization are related concepts but they could 
                                                
17 Gasparini, et.al., (2001)
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show different behaviors and this is what happened during this period. While inequality 
remained the same in statistical terms between 1998 and 2004, polarization decreased
strongly according to almost every index with 5% and 1% significance levels depending 
on the identification parameter considered (Table IV.3). 
Finally, during the 2004-06 range there were no significant changes in inequality and 
polarization measures for the hourly wages in Greater Buenos Aires. This result is 
reasonable if we take into account the relatively short length of this period of time. It is a 
well acknowledge fact that income distribution shows significant changes in its different 
attributes in mid or longer terms.
IV.2 Micro-decomposition
To further inquire about the sources of the changes in polarization indices we performed 
a micro-decomposition of the hourly labor income. In order to do so, we followes the 
methodology developed by Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2005) which 
should be consulted by the interested reader.
Methodology and estimation strategy
The micro-decomposition technique is based upon the computation of different 
distributions; the actual distribution for year t, and that resulting from simulating the 
hourly wages of each individual in year t by fixing some argument of their income-
determination function at the level of another year, t’. Let itw  be the individual i’s hourly 
wages at time t which can be written as a function F of the vector itX  of individual 
observable characteristics that affect wages and employment, the vector it  of 
unobservable characteristics and the vector t  of parameters that determine market 
hourly wages.
  NiXFw tititit ,,1,,   (4.1)
where N is total population. The distribution of individual hourly wages can be 
represented as follows:
 Nttt wwW ,,1  (4.2)
We can simulate individual hourly incomes by changing one or some arguments in 
equation 4.1. For instance, the following expression represents hourly wage that the 
individual i’s would have obtained in time t if the parameters had been those of time t’, 
keeping all other things constant:
    NiXFw titittit ,,1,, ''   (4.3)
Hence, the simulated distribution will be:
      ''1' ,, tNttttt wwW   (4.4)
The contribution to the overall change in the distribution of a change in the parameters 
vector or any other k-argument of the hourly wage function F , between t and t’, ceteris 
paribus, can be obtained by comparing the equations 4.2 and 4.4. Even though we can 
compare the whole distributions, we are interested in evaluate polarization indexes 
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)(WPI . Therefore, the effect of a change in a k-argument on the hourly wage distribution 
is given by:
   )()( ' tttt kWPIkWPI  (4.5)
The decomposition of the change in the DER polarization index was performed for the 
years 1986, 1992, 1998, 2004 and 2006 for values of the -parameter of 0.5 and 0.75. 
We changed parametric estimates of returns to education ( ed ), gender gap ( g ), 
returns to experience ( ex ), residuals, employment and education levels of the 
population. 
The econometric specification of the model estimated to analyze the effects of changes 
in parameters on polarization corresponds to the reduced form of the labor decisions 
model originally proposed by Heckman (1974).18 Leaving technical details aside and 
under general conditions, it is possible to derive a reduced form for the equilibrium 
relations in which wages and hours of work are expressed as functions of the variables 
taken as exogenous. In this way, the model has two equations –one for wages and one 
for the number of hours of work- and both are function of factors taken as given that 
affect wages and hours, which may or may not have elements in common. The error 
terms represent unobservable factors that affect the determination of endogenous 
variables.
Considering that we observe positive values of wages and hours of work for a particular 
individual if and only if the individual actually works, the reduced form model for these 
two variables is specified as follows19:
NiXw ittitit ,,1
11*   (4.6)
NiXL ittitit ,,1
22*   (4.7)
with
0**  ititit Lifww
00 *  itit Lifw
0**  ititit LifLL
00 *  itit LifL
where itw  and itL  are the observed wages and hours of work, respectively. For 
estimation purposes we assume that 1it  and 2it  have a bivariate normal distribution with
0)()( 21  itit EE  , variances 1t  and 2t , and correlation coefficient  . This particular 
specification corresponds to the Tobit type III model in Amemiya’s (1985) classification.20
To study the effect of the random term on polarization indexes changes we follow an 
approximate solution of the rank-preserving transformation operation.21 It consists of 
assuming that both distributions of residuals terms at t and t’ are the same up to a 
                                                
18 Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2005) pages 64-69.
19 Even though we estimate the   parameters, they are not relevant in our analysis. Equation (4.7) is an estimation tool
for 2it .
20 Idem.
21 This method consists in replacing the residual in the nth percentile (of residuals) at time t by the residuals in the nth
percentile at time t’, for all n. For further details see Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005).
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proportional transformation. In order to do so, we supposed previously that the error 
term of the hourly wage equations are normally distributed, with zero mean and their 
variance is estimated as an extra parameter in the Heckman procedure. The rank-
preserving transformation is then equivalent to multiplying the residual observed at time t
by the ratio of standard deviations at time t’ and t. Then,
    NiXw ttittititit ,,1ˆˆˆˆˆ 11'11 '  
With the purpose to examine the employment effects on labor polarization, the 
decomposition methodology requires simulating hourly wages for individuals who do not 
work. Because we do not observe wages, we cannot use the previous equations (4.6 
and 4.7) to estimate the residual terms. For each individual in that situation, we assigned 
as an “error term” a random draw from the bivariate normal distribution implicit in the 
wage-labor supply model whose parameters are consistently estimated by the Heckman 
procedure.22
Lastly, for the estimation of the education level effect, we used a rough nonparametric 
method. We divide the adult population in homogeneous groups by gender and age and 
then replicate the educative structure of a given cell in year t’ into the corresponding cell 
in year t. 23
Results
Before we present the results, two observations must be pointed out. First, the preceding 
decomposition has a restrictive property which is path dependence.24 Table IV.4 reports 
the average of using alternatively t and t’ as the base year.25  Second, a positive 
(negative) number of a k-argument change reveals two results: i) the sign of it indicates 
that the k-argument effect increased (reduced) polarization, and ii) the magnitude of it, 
compared with other changes, reveals how relevant was the contribution of the k-
argument to explain the observed change of the polarization index between t and t’.
First row of Table IV.8 shows the observed change in DER index for each period 
considered. The changes in returns to education had a cohesive effect on the hourly 
wage income distribution in the beginning (1986-92) and end (1998-04) of the six-year 
intervals. That is, if only the returns to education had changed between 1986-92 and 
1998-04, the DER index would have fallen in 0.6 and 1.3 points, respectively. However, 
they had an antagonize effect over the six years in between the previous periods (1992-
98). The outcomes are similar when we consider a higher level of identification. In each 
period, changes in the returns to education represent a relevant factor for explaining 
polarization movements.
Changes in gender parameters of the wage equation divide the whole period into two 
sub-periods. The first (1986-1998) is characterized by the shrunk in the gender wage 
                                                
22 See Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2005) page 69.
23 Idem.
24 This property means that changing the conditional income distribution from the one observed in t to that observed in t’
does not have the same effect on the distribution when this is done with the distribution of characteristics X observed in t, 
as when X is observed in t’ Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005).
25 Notice, to address the problem of the path dependence, Shorrocks (1999) provides a formal definition of the appropriate 
“averaging” concept on the basis of the Shapley values. Detail results were omitted and are disposable by request.
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gap which generates a polarized-diminishing effect. The second (1998-2004) describes
a polarized-increasing effect as a consequence of the expansion in this gap, as was 
pointed out in section III.2. Notice, the magnitude of this effect is insignificant in 
economical terms relative to the previous one.
The returns to experience (age) had a polarizing effect on the hourly wage income 
distribution in the first two periods which may be explained by the increase in the wage 
gap between middle-age and young-age groups. However, in the latter periods this 
effect changed its tendency implying cohesion between age groups. Again, the 
magnitude of the returns to experience effect is lower relative to that of the returns to 
education.
In general, changes in endowment and returns to unobservable factors have implied 
polarizing changes in hourly wages distribution. This effect was particularly strong in 
1992-98 period. This result suggests that an increase in the dispersion of unobservable
factors was, after returns to education, the main force affecting hourly wages polarization 
over the period under analysis.
Even the unemployment rate increased dramatically in the mid-90’s and it has remained 
high during the whole period, the employment effect on the hourly wage income 
distribution was negative and negligible (Table IV.6). The reason why the great increase 
in unemployment did not have any effect on hourly wages polarization changes is the 
stable employment rate that did not change significantly during the whole period as 
stated in section III.2. Hence, there was a minor change in the number of individuals 
without hourly wage income. 
Argentina, as many developing countries, has witnessed a dramatic change in the 
educational structure of its population during the 80’s and 90’s.26 The results show that
in Greater Buenos Aires that change had a polarized-increasing effect on hourly wages 
distribution over the whole period and particularly, during the 90’s. A rough explanation 
could be the contrast between a higher identification due to more educated population 
and a higher alienation as a result of educational level groups with relatively high 
dispersion. Hence, the second effect would compensate the first one implying an 
increased in antagonism.27  
The last row in Table IV.6 was estimated as a residual. It includes the effects of 
interaction terms and of many other factors not considered in the analysis. These terms 
are not as small as we expected, implying either that there are other relevant factors not 
considered in the analysis, such as institutional or sector effects, or that they do not tend 
to compensate each other.
                                                
26 Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2005)
27 It is important to notice that in this rough explanation we are not taking into account the correlation between alienation 
and identification.
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V. Concluding remarks
The empirical evidence reveals two stages over the last two decades (1986-2006): the 
first one characterized by an increment of all polarization indices and the second one, by 
shrinkage of them. 
We identify two vulnerable groups which have been excluded from the labor market, 
during 1992-98: the youth who joined the labor force and suffered a dramatically 
increased in their unemployment rates and those unskilled and semi-skilled individuals 
who experienced a strong separation from skilled people.
Inspecting potential factors which could explain those changes, returns to education
surge as the main polarization force in the labor market. They had a cohesion effect on 
the hourly wage income distribution in the beginning (1986-92) and end (1998-04) of the 
six-year intervals. Although, they had an antagonize effect over the six years in between 
the previous periods (1992-98). Other relevant forces are endowment and returns to 
unobservable factors and other factors such as interaction terms between 
unobservables and observables and many other variables e.g. institutional or sector 
effects.
Finally, an equalizing distribution of the human capital is a possible alternative for a less 
polarized labor market. A society with high levels of economic polarization would avoid 
perpetuating this characteristic of the income distribution if it ensures equal opportunities
to their individuals to obtain economic results. At the same time, education is a key tool 
for building common values which reinforces social cohesion. 
17
Bibliography
Alesina, and Spolaore (1997), On the number and size of nations Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 113, pp. 1027-1056.
Atkinson, A. and Bourguignon, F. (2000). Income distribution and economics. Handbook 
of Income Distribution. Elsevier Science B.V. Pg. 1-5, 41-50.
Bourguignon, F and Ferreira, F, (2005) Decomposing changes in the Distribution of 
household incomes: Methodological aspects, in Bourguignon, Ferreira and 
Lustig, The microeconomics of income distribution dynamics (in East Asia and 
Latin America), Oxford University Press, pp 17-46.
Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A.,(2001) Greed and grievance in civil war, World Bank 
(Washington D.C).
Cowell, F. (2000). Measuring inequality. LSE Handbooks in Economic Series, Prentice 
Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf
D’ Ambrosio, C (2001) Household characteristics and the distribution of income in Italy: 
an application of social distance measures, Review of Income and Wealth, 
(Series 47, Number 1, March 2001)
D’ Ambrosio, C and Wolf, E. (2001) Is Wealth Becoming More Polarized in The United 
States?, Working paper 330, Levy Economics Institute, Bard College.
Deaton, A. (1997). The analysis of household surveys. Microeconomic analysis for 
development policy. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Duclos, JY, Esteban, J. and Ray, D. (2004). Polarization: Concepts, Measurements, 
Estimation. Econometrica 72 (6), November, pp. 1737-1772.
Esteban, J. (2004) Economic integration and cross-country inequality: the European 
experience, International Policy Workshop (September, Berlin)
Esteban, J. and Ray, D. (1994), On the Measurement of Polarization. Econometrica 62, 
(4), November, pp. 819-852.
Esteban, J., Gradín, C. and Ray, D. (1999) Extensions of the measure of Polarization, 
with an application to the income distribution of five OECD countries, mimeo, 
Instituto de Análisis Económico.
Foster, J. and Wolfson, M. (1992), Polarization and the Decline of the Middle Class: 
Canada and the US, mimeo, Vanderbilt University.
Ganuza, E., Paes de Barros, R., Taylor, L. and Vos, R. (2001). Liberalización, 
desigualdad y pobreza: América Latina y el Caribe en los 90. Eudeba, PNUD, 
CEPAL.
Gasparini, L (2004 a) Different lives: inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Working paper CEDLAS. Chapter 2, 2004 World Bank LAC Flagship Report.
Gasparini, L (2004 b) Argentina’s Distributional Failure. The role of Integration and 
Public Policies. Marquez, G. (ed.) Labor Markets and Globalization in LAC. 
Forthcoming, 2005.
Gasparini, L., Haimovich, F. and Pacheco, A. (2005a). Mercados Laborales y Cohesión 
Social en América Latina. Working paper CIEPLAN, Chile. 
Gasparini,L., Horestein, M, Molina, E and Olivieri, S (2008), Polarización económica, 
instituciones y conflictos. Dinámicas de la cohesión social latinoamericana, 
PNUD-CIEPLAN, Chile.
Gasparini, L., Marchionni, M. and Sosa Escudero, W. (2001) “Distribución del Ingreso en 
la Argentina: Perspectivas y Efectos Sobre el Bienestar”, Premio Fulvio Salvador 
Pagani.
18
Gasparini, L, Marchionni, M and Sosa Escudero, W (2005b), Characterization of 
inequality changes through microeconometric decompositions: the case of 
Greater Buenos Aires, in Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig, The microeconomics 
of income distribution dynamics (in East Asia and Latin America), Oxford 
University Press, pp 47-83.
Gasparini, L. and Tornarolli, L., “Labor informality in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
patterns and trends from household microdata survey”, Working paper N46,
CEDLAS–UNLP.
Gradín, C (2003) Polarization and inequality in Spain: 1973-1991, Universidade de Vigo 
(Vigo, Spain)
Gradín, C. (2000) Polarization by sub-populations in Spain, 1973-91, Review of Income 
and Wealth, (Series 46, Number 4, December)
Haimovich, F., Gasparini, L. and Winkler, H. (2005). Distribución del Ingreso en América 
Latina: Explorando las Diferencias entre Países. XL Reunión de la AAEP, La 
Plata.
Horenstein, M. and Olivieri, S. (2004), Income polarization in Argentina: Pure Income 
Polarization, Theory and Applications, Económica, Nº 1-2, Año L, (La Plata, 
Argentina, Enero-Diciembre).
IADB (1998). América Latina frente a la desigualdad. Banco Interamericano de 
Desarrollo, Washington, D.C.
Lambert, P. (2001). The distribution and redistribution of income. Manchester University 
Press. 
Morley, S. (2000). La distribución del ingreso en América latina y el Caribe. Fondo de 
Cultura Económica. 
Reynal-Querol, M. (2001) Ethnicity, political system and civil wars, Institut d’Analisis 
Economic (IAE), CSIC (Barcelona, Spain).
Ricardo, D. (1817). Principles of Political Economy. Dent, London. 
Sánchez-Páramo, C. and Schady, N. (2003). Off and running? Technology, trade and 
rising demand for skilled workers in Latin America. Closing the gap in education 
and technology in Latin America, background paper. 
SEDLAC (2008). Socio-economic database for Latin American and the Caribbean. 
www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas
Sen, A. (2000). Social justice and the distribution of income. Handbook of Income 
Distribution. Elsevier Science B.V. 
Shorrocks, A (1999) Decomposition procedures for distributional analysis: A unified 
framework based on the Shapley values. University of Essex, Essex, U.K. 
Processed. 
Sosa Escudero, W. and Gasparini,L (2000) A Note on the statistical significance of 
changes in inequality, Económica, Nº1, Año XLVI, (La Plata, Argentina).
Viollaz, M. (2008), Polarización de ingresos laborales. Argentina 1992-2006, Working 
paper N70, CEDLAS-UNDP.
Wodon, Q. et al. (2000). Poverty and policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. World 
Bank Technical Paper 467.
Wolfson, M. (1994), When Inequality Diverges, American Economic Review, 84, 353-
358.
Zhang, X. and Kanbur, R (2001), What difference do polarization measures make? An 
application to China, Journal of Development Studies, 37, pp. 85-98.
19
Table III. 1
Labor gaps by gender, age groups, educational level and informality condition
Greater Buenos Aires (1986 – 2006)
Ratios by gender
Hourly wages Hours of work
(male/female) (male/female)
1986 1.210 1.194
1992 1.071 1.278
1998 1.111 1.324
2004 1.219 1.412
2006 1.118 1.383
Ratios by age groups
(25-65/15-24) (25-64)/(+65) (25-65/15-24) (25-64)/(+65)
1986 1.589 0.876 1.197 1.146
1992 1.560 1.043 1.086 1.223
1998 1.735 0.796 1.100 1.225
2004 1.761 0.416 1.072 1.220
2006 1.783 0.798 1.079 1.235
Ratios by educational level
high /medium level low / medium level high /medium level low / medium level
1986 1.584 0.694 0.909 1.013
1992 1.734 0.739 0.897 0.982
1998 2.155 0.761 0.876 0.966
2004 2.290 0.712 0.896 0.936
2006 2.099 0.721 0.871 0.940
Ratios by informality labor condition
informal / non informal 
(productive definition)
informal / non 
informal (legal 
definition)
informal / non 
informal (productive 
definition)
informal / non 
informal (legal 
definition)
1986 0.841 0.715 0.958 0.889
1992 0.813 0.770 0.978 0.932
1998 0.691 0.664 0.888 0.896
2004 0.731 0.643 0.981 0.789
2006 0.671 0.499 0.962 0.830
Hourly wages Hours of work
Year
Year
Year
Year
Hourly wages Hours of work
Hourly wages Hours of work
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua).
Table III.2
Returns to college education and gender gap in terms of hourly wages
 Coefficients of a Mincer equation 
Gender gap
Educational level 
gap
1986 0.248 0.552
[0.040]*** [0.055]***
1992 0.403 0.526
[0.056]*** [0.059]***
1998 0.158 0.745
[0.037]*** [0.048]***
2004 0.097 0.636
[0.082] [0.055]***
2006 0.174 0.777
[0.045]*** [0.042]***
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
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Table III.3
Polarization by characteristics
Greater Buenos Aires (1986-2006)
ZK GGP ZK GGP ZK GGP ZK GGP ZK GGP ZK GGP ZK GGP
1986 0.01 0.70 0.05 0.78 0.34 1.20 0.07 0.93 0.01 0.70 0.05 0.756 0.014 0.730
1988 0.00 0.66 0.06 0.79 0.38 1.26 0.05 0.82 0.01 0.63 0.08 0.778 0.048 0.794
1991 0.00 0.62 0.04 0.78 0.30 1.17 0.08 0.91 0.03 0.72 0.05 0.780 0.014 0.732
1992 0.00 0.66 0.05 0.81 0.30 1.15 0.07 0.91 0.02 0.76 0.04 0.772 0.000 0.662
1993 0.00 0.65 0.04 0.78 0.26 1.12 0.09 0.91 0.02 0.73 0.02 0.727 0.002 0.672
1994 0.00 0.66 0.05 0.78 0.30 1.15 0.09 0.92 0.02 0.74 0.03 0.743 0.011 0.722
1995 0.00 0.61 0.05 0.78 0.39 1.24 0.07 0.91 0.09 0.81 0.04 0.751 0.017 0.727
1996 0.00 0.58 0.05 0.77 0.42 1.23 0.08 0.93 0.06 0.80 0.02 0.711 0.011 0.709
1997 0.00 0.61 0.05 0.78 0.35 1.19 0.07 0.91 0.06 0.78 0.04 0.764 0.029 0.763
1998 0.00 0.61 0.05 0.76 0.41 1.25 0.10 0.96 0.05 0.77 0.07 0.786 0.040 0.773
1999 0.00 0.59 0.05 0.77 0.42 1.25 0.14 1.02 0.05 0.76 0.07 0.800 0.037 0.768
2000 0.00 0.58 0.06 0.77 0.37 1.23 0.14 1.02 0.03 0.71 0.06 0.775 0.015 0.699
2001 0.00 0.59 0.05 0.74 0.33 1.22 0.08 0.92 0.04 0.70 0.06 0.770 0.021 0.704
2002 0.00 0.60 0.04 0.72 0.41 1.27 0.09 0.94 0.05 0.71 0.14 0.852 0.027 0.714
2003 (1) 0.00 0.63 0.04 0.72 0.35 1.23 0.14 1.03 0.05 0.69 0.05 0.752 0.045 0.762
2003 0.00 0.56 0.04 0.72 0.24 1.15 0.09 0.93 0.04 0.72 0.11 0.851 0.011 0.649
2004 0.00 0.61 0.04 0.74 0.30 1.17 0.10 0.94 0.03 0.74 0.10 0.839 0.028 0.723
2005 0.00 0.62 0.04 0.74 0.40 1.24 0.13 0.99 0.04 0.70 0.12 0.855 0.045 0.755
2006 0.00 0.62 0.05 0.75 0.38 1.23 0.14 1.02 0.04 0.71 0.20 0.922 0.089 0.799
Labor relation Informality (Legal) Informality 2 (Prodcutivity)Gender Age Educational level Sector
Note: GGP= Gradín Group Polarization Index with =1,=1
          ZK=Zhang and Kanbur index. 
          (1) EPH puntual
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
Table III.4
Sign of changes in the ZK measure and its components
1986-1992 1992-1998 1998-2004 2004-2006
Gender
ZK (-) (-) (+) (+)
Wth (-) (+) (-) (+)
Btw (-) (-) (+) (+)
Age
ZK (+) (-) (-) (+)
Wth (-) (+) (-) (+)
Btw (-) (+) (-) (+)
Educational Level
ZK (-) (+) (+) (+)
Wth (-) (+) (-) (-)
Btw (-) (+) (-) (+)
Sector
ZK (-) (+) (+) (+)
Wth (-) (+) (-) (-)
Btw (-) (+) (+) (+)
Labor relation
ZK (+) (+) (-) (+)
Wth (-) (+) (-) (+)
Btw (+) (+) (-) (+)
Informality (L)
ZK (-) (+) (-) (+)
Wth (-) (+) (-) (+)
Btw (-) (+) (-) (+)
Informality 2 (P)
ZK (-) (+) (+) (+)
Wth (-) (+) (-) (-)
Btw (-) (+) (+) (+)
Note: ZK=Zhang and Kanbur index. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and 
second semester (EPH-Continua)
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Table IV.1
Pure Income polarization - Hourly labor income
Greater Buenos Aires (1986-2006)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
Note: (1) EPH Puntual
Table IV.2
Inequality and Pure Income Polarization confidence intervals - Hourly labor income
Greater Buenos Aires (1986-2006)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
Notes: (1) EPH Puntual May 2003.
        500 bootstrap replications
1 1.3 1.6 1 1.3 1.6 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
1986 0.391 0.319 0.170 0.123 0.087 0.632 0.426 0.290 0.288 0.240 0.213 0.196
1988 0.425 0.373 0.191 0.140 0.100 0.688 0.466 0.319 0.308 0.253 0.221 0.201
1991 0.389 0.313 0.170 0.125 0.089 0.620 0.418 0.284 0.288 0.239 0.212 0.195
1992 0.372 0.315 0.163 0.117 0.081 0.590 0.400 0.272 0.279 0.232 0.205 0.187
1993 0.381 0.334 0.169 0.123 0.086 0.613 0.417 0.286 0.285 0.236 0.208 0.189
1994 0.385 0.315 0.169 0.123 0.086 0.621 0.421 0.288 0.286 0.237 0.208 0.190
1995 0.419 0.351 0.186 0.135 0.096 0.678 0.459 0.314 0.304 0.249 0.218 0.198
1996 0.421 0.347 0.185 0.135 0.096 0.682 0.461 0.315 0.305 0.251 0.221 0.201
1997 0.400 0.342 0.173 0.125 0.087 0.647 0.438 0.298 0.295 0.240 0.208 0.186
1998 0.424 0.368 0.188 0.137 0.096 0.688 0.467 0.320 0.309 0.252 0.219 0.198
1999 0.414 0.373 0.187 0.136 0.096 0.668 0.454 0.311 0.304 0.248 0.215 0.193
2000 0.430 0.392 0.195 0.143 0.101 0.701 0.476 0.327 0.315 0.256 0.222 0.200
2001 0.443 0.402 0.201 0.148 0.105 0.722 0.490 0.336 0.321 0.259 0.223 0.198
2002 0.449 0.429 0.210 0.155 0.112 0.724 0.492 0.338 0.326 0.263 0.226 0.201
2003 (1) 0.442 0.401 0.198 0.144 0.100 0.696 0.472 0.323 0.318 0.255 0.218 0.192
2003 0.441 0.378 0.196 0.143 0.102 0.702 0.475 0.324 0.316 0.255 0.220 0.196
2004 0.410 0.343 0.173 0.124 0.084 0.649 0.440 0.300 0.300 0.241 0.204 0.179
2005 0.411 0.348 0.178 0.128 0.089 0.650 0.442 0.299 0.300 0.241 0.205 0.181
2006 0.411 0.351 0.178 0.128 0.088 0.656 0.444 0.302 0.300 0.242 0.206 0.181
Gini Wolfson a = a = a = 
EGR(2) EGR(3) DER
Obs Lowest Highest Obs Lowest Highest Obs Lowest Highest
1986 0.391 0.374 0.408 0.240 0.232 0.247 0.213 0.206 0.220
1988 0.425 0.411 0.439 0.253 0.244 0.258 0.221 0.215 0.228
1991 0.389 0.372 0.404 0.239 0.230 0.247 0.212 0.203 0.219
1992 0.372 0.357 0.388 0.232 0.225 0.239 0.205 0.198 0.212
1993 0.381 0.368 0.395 0.236 0.230 0.241 0.208 0.200 0.214
1994 0.385 0.371 0.400 0.237 0.229 0.243 0.208 0.201 0.215
1995 0.419 0.405 0.437 0.249 0.243 0.256 0.218 0.211 0.224
1996 0.421 0.402 0.439 0.251 0.243 0.259 0.221 0.212 0.229
1997 0.400 0.387 0.415 0.240 0.234 0.246 0.208 0.202 0.213
1998 0.424 0.410 0.438 0.252 0.243 0.258 0.219 0.214 0.225
1999 0.414 0.400 0.429 0.248 0.242 0.253 0.215 0.208 0.220
2000 0.430 0.416 0.443 0.256 0.250 0.262 0.222 0.216 0.228
2001 0.443 0.429 0.459 0.259 0.251 0.265 0.223 0.215 0.229
2002 0.449 0.431 0.468 0.263 0.254 0.271 0.226 0.218 0.234
2003 (1) 0.442 0.420 0.466 0.255 0.245 0.264 0.218 0.208 0.227
2003 0.441 0.424 0.460 0.255 0.247 0.263 0.220 0.211 0.227
2004 0.410 0.398 0.423 0.241 0.236 0.246 0.204 0.198 0.209
2005 0.411 0.399 0.427 0.241 0.234 0.246 0.205 0.199 0.210
2006 0.411 0.398 0.426 0.242 0.234 0.248 0.206 0.201 0.212
DER
a = 0.5 a = 0.75
Gini DER
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Table IV.3
Pure Income Polarization and Inequality changes
Greater Buenos Aires (1986-2006)
Source: Own estimations based on SEDLAC. 
Note: 500 bootstrap replications. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; ** at 1%
1986-1992 1992-1998 1998-2004 2004-2006
Gini (=) (+)*** (=) (=)
Wolfson (=) (+)*** (=) (=)
EGR(2)
a = 1.0 (=) (+)*** (-)** (=)
a = 1.3 (=) (+)*** (-)** (=)
a = 1.6 (=) (+)*** (-)** (=)
EGR(3)
a = 1.0 (-)** (+)*** (-)** (=)
a = 1.3 (-)* (+)*** (-)** (=)
a = 1.6 (-)* (+)*** (-)** (=)
DER
a = 0.25 (=) (+)*** (=) (=)
a = 0.50 (=) (+)*** (-)** (=)
a = 0.75 (=) (+)*** (-)*** (=)
a = 1.00 (=) (+)* (-)*** (=)
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Table IV.8
Decomposition of the change in the DER index: Average results changing the base year in 
Greater Buenos Aires, selected periods
Indicator  = 0.50
1986 - 92 1992 - 98 1998 - 04 2004- 06
Observed -0.8 2.0 -1.2 0.1
Effects
1. Returns to education -0.6 1.3 -1.3 1.1
2. Gender wage gap -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0
3. Returns to experience 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.7
4. Unobservables 0.2 0.8 0.7 -0.5
5. Employment 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
6. Education structure 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2
7. Other factors -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1
Indicator  = 0.75
1986 - 92 1992 - 98 1998 - 04 2004- 06
Observed -0.8 1.4 -1.7 0.2
Effects
1. Returns to education -0.4 1.0 -1.1 0.9
2. Gender wage gap -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0
3. Returns to experience 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.5
4. Unobservables 0.1 0.6 0.5 -0.3
5. Employment 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
6. Education structure -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
7. Other factors -0.5 -0.3 -1.1 0.0
Note: The hourly wages distribution includes those individuals with 0itw ,   0' itit kw  and we 
exclude those wages which are greater than 20 times the median.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and 
second semester (EPH-Continua)
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Figure III.1
Percent change in employment, unemployment and participation rates by gender, age and 
educational levels
Greater Buenos Aires (1986 – 2006)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
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Figure III.2
Employment and unemployment rates by age groups 
Greater Buenos Aires (1986 – 2006)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
Figure III.3
Employment and unemployment rates by educational levels 
Greater Buenos Aires (1986 – 2006)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
Employment rate Unemployment rate
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
15-24 25-64 +65
1986 1992 1998
2004 2006
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
15-24 25-64 +65
1986 1992 1998
2004 2006
Employment rate Unemployment rate
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
unskilled semi-skilled skilled
1986 1992 1998
2004 2006
0
5
10
15
20
unskilled semi-skilled skilled
1986 1992 1998
2004 2006
26
Figure III.4
Labor gaps by gender, age, educational levels and informality condition
Greater Buenos Aires (1986 – 2006)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
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Figure IV.1
Wage Inequality and Polarization
Greater Buenos Aires (1986 – 2006)
                          (a) Gini and Wolfson                                                    (b) EGR(2)
                    (c) EGR(3)                                                         (d) EGR(2)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
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Figure IV.2
Inequality and polarization confidence intervals
Greater Buenos Aires (1986 – 2006)
                                                                
                                                                       (a) Gini
                  (b) DER. α =0.50 (c) DER. α =0.75
Note: 500 bootstrap replications.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEDLAC, Greater Buenos Aires, October wave (EPH-Puntual) and second 
semester (EPH-Continua)
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Methodological appendix
Gradín Group Polarization Index (GGP)
Gradín (2000) assumes that despite polarization occurring in the income space, groups 
in the distribution are the result of similarities with respect to a relevant attribute other 
than income. Thus, he treats the distribution as if it were the aggregate result of more 
than one stochastic process. In this sense, a population can be divided into “n” groups or 
sub-populations according with any characteristic (e.g. race, region, occupation, etc.). 
The number of groups depends on the nature of the characteristic. Groups are 
exogenously conformed according to whether their members share the same category 
for a given characteristic regardless of their income proximity. Compared to identification 
by income intervals, we expect higher intra-group dispersion and lower between groups 
heterogeneity. 
Define a partition  nnc m,...m;q,...q 11 , where qi is the population share in group i and 
m1 m2 …. m3 indicate average incomes of the groups. The measure is defined in 
accordance with the EGR(1999) index as:
 1);(),()(),,;(),,;(  cccc FERFPFGP 
)()();( cc GFGF  
The error term is expressed in parallel to EGR(1999) and accounts for both intra-group 
inequality as well as overlap between groups.28
The index is sensitive to the number of categories for which the characteristic is 
expressed. In particular, the smaller the number, the larger we expect both terms in the 
index, so the net effect is ambiguous. The most relevant characteristics will be those 
showing at the same time high polarization between the groups and homogeneity within 
them.
Zhang and Kanbur Index (ZK)
Zhang and Kanbur (2001) propose an index of polarization based on the ratio of the 
between-group inequality to the within-group inequality – both measured with Theil’s 
Generalized Entropy index. This polarization index captures the average distance 
between groups in relation to income differences within groups. As the groups become 
internally more homogeneous, within-group inequality diminishes, differences across 
groups are, relatively speaking, magnified and polarization is higher. Similarly, if we 
leave within-group inequality unchanged as the distance between-group increases, 
polarization rises. 
The measure for polarization suggested by Zhang and Kanbur is:29
W
B
T
T
ZK 
                                                
28 For a more detailed treatment of the subject we refer the reader to Gradín (2000) and Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999).
29 For a more detailed treatment of the subject we refer the reader to Zhang and Kanbur (2001).
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Tangent on the median
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K: number of groups; nj: number of individuals in each group; N: total number of 
individuals; j: mean income of each group; : mean income; yi: individual income.
Wolfson(1994) 
Wolfson’s polarization measure is derived from the Lorenz curve. It is defined as twice 
the area between the Lorenz curve and the tangent line at the median point (see figure 
bellow). 
It can be written as:



 
2
)5.0(5.0
G
L
m
PW

where = mean, m= median, L(0.5) = value of the Lorenz curve at the median income
and G = Gini coefficient. Polarization reaches the maximum value when half of the 
population has zero income and the other half has twice the mean. Wolfson shows that 
like the Gini, this index lies between zero and one.
This measure has problems when there are several income poles. The income 
distribution in the second panel of the next graph is intuitively less polarised than the 
income distribution in the first panel, since income masses are less identified. However, 
the Wolfson index shows the opposite result because it implicitly assumes the existence 
of two groups of equal size.
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ER(1994)
Esteban and Ray (1994) introduce a model of individual attitudes in a society and use 
four axioms to narrow down the set of possible measures. In particular, they suppose 
that each individual is subject to two forces. On the one hand she identifies with those 
she considers to be members of her own group. I:    represents the identification 
function. On the other hand, she feels alienated from those she considers to be 
members of other groups. a:   is the alienation function. An individual with 
income y feels alienation a((y, y’)) from an individual with income y’, where (y, y’) 
stands simply for the absolute distance |y-y’|. Note that alienation, as well as 
identification, is perfectly symmetric in this scheme. The joint effect of the two forces is 
given by the effective antagonism function, T(I,a). Total polarization in the society is 
postulated to be the sum of all the effective antagonisms: 

 

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n
j
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1 1

Esteban and Ray demonstrate that the only measure of this family which satisfies the 
axioms has the following expression:
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For k>0 and [1, 1.6] where  indicates the degree of sensitivity to polarization.
EGR(1999)
Esteban, Gradín and Ray (1999) state that the ER (1994) polarization measure for 
discrete groups or “n-spike representation” should be used only after the population has 
been regrouped in a way that captures the group identification structure of society. This 
clustering will lose some of the initial information that concerns the dispersion of the 
population around the clusters that are treated as single groups: the ER measure needs 
to be corrected. EGR propose the following polarization measure: 
),f(),(ER),;f(P  
The first term is the ER measure of polarization and the second term is a measurement 
error or lack of identification weighted by a free parameter .
Diagrammatically a n-spike representation is equivalent to transforming the original 
Lorenz Curve into a piecewise linear Lorenz curve (with n pieces):
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In other words each individual in a given group is assumed to have the same income. 
Hence the minimal error term is obtained through the minimisation of the area between 
the original Lorenz curve and the piecewise linear representation. It is therefore 
immediate that:
*)(G)f(G*),f(  
where G(.) assigns the Gini coefficient to the distribution variable in its argument and * 
is the optimal n-spike representation that best approximates to the real distribution. 
Combining the previous equations:
 *)(G)f(G),(ER),,f(P  
Duclos-Esteban-Ray index (DER)
The following axioms that are satisfied by the DER index are based on a density with 
finite support (kernel), and symmetric reductions in dispersion that concentrate the 
density around its mean (squeezes).
Axiom 1: if a distribution is made up of a basic density, then a squeeze cannot increase 
polarization. 
Axiom 2: if a symmetric distribution is composed by three basic densities then a squeeze 
in the outer densities should not reduce polarization.
Axiom 3: if we consider a symmetric distribution made up of four basic densities with 
disjoint supports, then a move of the center distributions towards their outer neighbours, 
while keeping the disjoint supports, should increase polarization. 
Ingreso
Income
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Axiom 4: Given two distributions F and G, if P(F) ≥ P(G), being P(F) and P(G) the 
respective polarization indexes, it must be that P(F) ≥ P(G), where F and G 
represent a rescaled version of F and G.
The authors establish that a general polarization measure that respects the previous 
axioms must be proportional to:
   dydxxyyfxffP )()()( 1 
where f(y) and f(x) denote the income (or other well-being measure) density function. 
The formula can be rewritten as
 )()()()( ydFygyfFP 
where F(y) denotes the income distribution function, g(y) captures the “alienation” effect, 
and f(y) the “identification” effect. 
If we have a sample of incomes with independent and identically distributed 
observations ranked from smallest to highest, the DER operational formula is:
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where yi is the i-th individual income, ˆ is the sample mean, wi is the weight of individual 
i, and 
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The function )(ˆ iyf  is a nonparametric kernel estimate of the income density, using a 
bandwidth that minimizes the mean square error of the estimator h*. Duclos, Esteban 
and Ray (2004) provide other formulas that are easier to compute. The first can be used 
with normal distributions and will not exceed the h* that minimizes the mean squared 
error by more than 5%:
157.4*  nh
The second is for distributions with skewness greater than 6: 
)153237268(
ln
4
ln5
)10*09.11(
)7.1476.3(
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
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where IQ is the interquantile range, and ln is the variance of  log-income. 
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